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Abstract
The paper builds upon an original pre- and post-election survey that we conducted before 
and after the 2015 Canadian election. Directly after Election Day, we asked Canadians for 
which party they voted, and whether they regret their choice. We find that 39% of them are 
not perfectly happy with their decision, and 4% even say that they made a bad decision. We 
show that the propensity to regret can be explained by a mixed-utility theory, whereby vot-
ers attempt to maximize a mixture of instrumental and expressive utilities. Our study con-
tributes to the literatures on voting behaviour and political economy, which usually consid-
ers that voters are either instrumental or expressive, but not both at the same time.
Keywords Voting behaviour · Expressive voting · Vote choice regret
JEL Classification D72 · D84 · D91
1 Introduction
Voters sometimes regret their choices. That issue has made the headlines in the United 
Kingdom after the Brexit referendum on membership in the European Union (The Inde-
pendent 2016). Numerous voters said that they voted “Leave” but would have voted 
differently if they had known that the Leave option was going to win. Indeed, most 
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1112 
7-018-0571-z) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Damien Bol 
 damien.bol@kcl.ac.uk
 André Blais 
 andre.blais@umontreal.ca
 Jean-François Laslier 
 jean-francois.laslier@ens.fr
1 Department of Political Economy, King’s College London (KCL), 30 Aldwych (Bush House), 
London WC2B 4BG, UK
2 Départment de Science Politique, Université de Montréal (UdeM), C.P. 6128, Succursale 
Centre-Ville, Montreal, QC H3C 3J7, Canada
3 Paris School of Economics, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France
 Public Choice
1 3
pre-referendum polls predicted a (close) victory for the “Remain” camp. That situation 
echoes the 2002 presidential election in France, during which the far-right candidate Jean-
Marie Le Pen advanced to the second round of voting to the surprise of most journalists 
and political pundits. Again, many left-wing voters expressed regret for not having voted 
for the center-left candidate Lionel Jospin, who failed to qualify for the second round 
(Radio France International 2002). The recent election of Donald Trump as the President 
of the United States also has its share of vote choice regrets, usually among Trump voters 
who thought Clinton would win (Vox 2017).
Yet, vote choice regret1 is not specific to extraordinary elections with surprising out-
comes. As we show in this paper, many voters regret their choices in ‘normal’ elections 
too. In an original survey conducted the week directly following the 2015 Canadian elec-
tion, we find that 39% of voters express some regret about their choices; 4% of them even 
say that they made a bad decision. At that moment, voters knew which party would form 
the government, but the cabinet had not yet been assembled, and no policy had been imple-
mented. In other words, the only relevant event that happened between vote choices and the 
post-election survey was the public release of the electoral result.2
A situation in which a large proportion of voters regret their choices the week after the 
election certainly is not desirable. Vote choice regret cannot be triggered by the actions of 
the new government, as the government had not yet been formed; it must come from the 
election itself, and likely means that the voters wrongly anticipated the electoral results.3 
Moreover, the situation is particularly problematic when it appears that the electoral out-
come would have been different if regretting voters had a chance to change their votes.4 For 
example, the evidence suggests that the Remain option would have won if another Brexit 
1 This paper is about the regret of voting for a given party; we call this vote choice regret. Our mixed-utility 
theory relates directly to the ‘regret theory’ proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) in the sense that we 
use a similar definition of regret in the presence of uncertainty. However, unlike them, we do not assume 
that voters anticipate the possibility of regretting their votes before voting. Closer to our topic, a small lit-
erature studies regret in the context of voter turnout. That literature usually argues that the decision to turn 
out is explained mostly by intrinsic individual motives, such as interest in politics and a sense of civic duty 
(Blais 2000; Kamm and Schram 2019; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).
2 For this paper, we rely on Canadian data. In Canada, elections are held under single-member district plu-
rality rule. This electoral system has the advantage of creating straightforward incentives for voters: they 
vote in a district, the party with most votes in that district wins the seat, and the party with most seats 
across districts forms the government. We believe that the argument we develop also applies to elections 
held under multi-member district proportional representation. However, the story would need to be more 
complex given that more than two viable parties compete per district, and voters need to consider potential 
governing coalitions to make their vote choice decisions (Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Duch et al. 2010; Indri-
dason 2011). It is important to note that Canada has no history of governing coalitions at the national level. 
In the 2015 election analysed in this paper, it was clear no coalition would be necessary even if the Liberal 
Party would not have won a majority of seats.
3 In theory, a voter could also regret her choice because she changes her preference after having voted. In 
this study, we look at vote choice regret under the assumption that voters’ preferences remain the same dur-
ing the week following the election. In the empirical analysis, we relax that assumption by adding control 
variables capturing other sources of regret, including a change in preferences.
4 Another reason to study vote choice regret is that it can undermine voters’ satisfaction with democracy. 
In our post-election survey, we asked respondents whether they are satisfied with the way democracy works 
in their country on a scale from 0 (not satisfied at all) to 10 (very satisfied). In the online appendix (A3), we 
report a negative association between regret and satisfaction with democracy. On average, satisfaction with 
democracy declines as voters become more regretful (p < 0.01). However, the association is small because 
the predicted value of satisfaction moves from 7 (vote choice is a very good decision) to 5.5 (vote choice 
was a very bad decision). This evidence shows that vote choice regret is a different attitude than satisfaction 
with democracy, although the two are associated.
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referendum had been organized a few weeks after the actual referendum. Data from the 
British Election Study (2016) show that around 6% of Leave voters were ready to change 
their vote. In this paper, we do not claim to evaluate whether the outcome of the 2015 
Canadian election would have been different if voters who expressed regret in our survey 
could have changed their votes. However, we offer an explanation for why some voters 
express regret. This is, to our knowledge, the first study that provides an explanation of 
vote choice regret.
The point we want to make is that we can explain the presence of regret for rational 
individuals with stable preferences if we assume that voters seek to maximize a mixed-
utility function composed of both instrumental and expressive motives (on the definition of 
‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’, see Hamlin and Jennings 2011; Hillman 2010; and below). 
By mixed-utility, we mean that voters gain some benefit from voting instrumentally, plus 
some benefits from voting expressively. Using their single vote, they cast ballots to maxi-
mize their overall benefit, which is a mixture of instrumental and expressive benefits. In 
other words, (at least some) voters who regret their choice do so because they realize ex 
post, and in view of the results, that they did not vote for the party that maximizes their 
mixed utility. The conflict between the two motives explains why some people end up vot-
ing for a party that does not maximize their utility, and subsequently can regret their choice 
upon learning the election results. In order to prove our point, we construct a simple and 
parsimonious mixed-utility theory of vote choice that relies on district-level results and 
answers to only one survey question (i.e., party liking). We show that the theory is sup-
ported by the data: it explains a substantial part of vote choice regret even when we control 
for other relevant variables.
This paper thus provides new evidence about an old, yet timely, debate about voters’ 
motivations. Classic economic theories, in particular the popular Hotelling-Downs model 
of spatial competition (Downs 1957; Hotelling 1929), assume that voters have instrumen-
tal motives, in the sense that they care about the outcome of the election. In the seminal 
work of Duverger (1954), such instrumental motives explain why some voters strategically 
desert their preferred party in plurality elections. When their preferred party is too small 
and has few chances of winning, they cast a vote for their preferred large party as to maxi-
mize their chances of influencing the election’s outcome.5
Attempts have been made to add expressiveness as another source of motivation to vot-
ing models (Brennan and Hamlin 1998; Piketty 2000; Laslier and Weibull 2013; Schuessler 
2001). Following that literature, the expressive voter does not consider how other voters 
will vote (contrary to the instrumental voter who wants to affect the outcome but can do 
so only if her vote is decisive), as what matters to her is the preference conveyed by her 
individual vote regardless of outcome. The empirical literature that relies on survey data 
finds that some voters cast vote as if they were purely instrumental, and others as if they 
were purely expressive (Drinkwater and Jennings 2007; Kan and Yang 2001). Experimen-
tal studies also make the distinction between instrumental and expressive voters, showing 
that ‘pivotality’ affects the relative proportion of both types (Copeland and Laband 2002; 
Feddersen et al. 2009; Fischer 1996; Tyran 2004). Other studies find evidence that some 
voters do vote expressively, in utilizing ‘natural’ quasi-experiments, such as the ban of a 
party in Spain (Arenas 2016), or the qualification-threshold for the second round in France 
5 In reality, an individual voter has virtually no chance of affecting the outcome of an election. In this 
paper, we adopt an approach similar to other studies that approximate the probability of being pivotal by the 
closeness of the election (Blais 2000; Castanheira 2003; Kan and Yang 2001; and below).
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(Pons and Tricaud 2017). The literature on strategic voting also sometimes considers that 
voters derive some utility from voting expressively, instead of strategically, which in turn 
explains the frequency of situations of incomplete coordination (Eggers and Vyvian 2018; 
Myatt 2007).
So, ways to establish the relevance of expressive voting empirically are possible. How-
ever, it is impossible to know whether observations of votes are the result of the coex-
istence of two types of ‘pure voters’ or of one type of ‘mixed-utility voters’, who are 
motivated by both instrumental and expressive benefits, and end up voting in one way or 
another depending on the circumstances. The study of vote choice regret offers a unique 
opportunity in that respect. Unlike vote choice, which yields only one data point about vot-
ers’ preferences, vote choice regret gives a more fine-grained measure of whether the voter 
is ambivalent regarding several possible options.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present our mixed-utility theory, which 
aims to explain vote choice regret. Second, we describe the data that we use to test the 
theory. Third, we show that the empirical evidence strongly supports our argument. Finally, 
we conclude in deriving the contributions of this study for the literatures on political econ-
omy and voting behaviour.
2  A mixed‑utility theory of vote choice regret
Our theory supposes that a voter derives utility from two sources: how much she likes the 
party for which she votes (expressive utility), and how much her vote makes a difference to 
the party that is elected (instrumental utility).6 These utilities are defined below. To illus-
trate the difference between the two, let us just take the example of two fictitious voters: 
André is an expressive voter and votes for party A because A is the party that defends 
the policies he stands for; Jean-François is an instrumental voter and he votes for party B 
because B is the party that will implement his most preferred policies. The key difference 
between the two is that André is not affected by the probability of winning of the different 
parties when he decides for which party to vote; he derives satisfaction from the act of vot-
ing for his preferred party. By contrast, Jean-François does consider the different parties’ 
probabilities of winning, as he wants his vote to make influence which party is elected. 
That goal typically implies voting for a party that has some chance of winning in his local 
district.
If voters are partly expressive and partly instrumental, they might face a two-choice 
alternative: voting for their instrumental (like Jean-François) or expressive choice (like 
André). If we go back to our examples, let us assume that Jean-François is partly instru-
mental and partly expressive. He favors party A. Unfortunately for him, party A is so small 
that it has virtually no chance of winning. Therefore, he decides to vote for party B because 
he thinks that party B has some chance of winning. He will regret his choice if he realizes, 
after the election, that party B had no greater chance of winning than party A. Similarly, 
André, who is also partly instrumental and partly expressive, will regret his choice if he 
realizes, after the election, that his vote could have elected party B. Just like Jean-François 
6 Our theory is focused on the utility associated with the voter’s own vote. The utility derived from seeing a 
candidate winning is not specified directly.
Public Choice 
1 3
he also thinks that he would be better off under the policies of party B than under the poli-
cies of the party that won the election.
Let us now define the utilities formally. We consider that the utility for voter i to vote for 
party a is:
The parameter ϕ can possibly vary between 0 and 1; it is the relative weight the voter 
gives to expressive utility (compared to instrumental utility). A rational voter votes for the 
party that maximizes the function. When ϕ = 1, she is a purely expressive voter: she will 
vote for the party she likes the most. When ϕ = 0, she is a purely instrumental voter: she 
will vote for the party she likes more among the top two parties running in the district. In a 
plurality system with single member districts like Canada, the voter can make a difference 
only for one of the two parties that we label as ‘viable’. By logical implication, a third party 
is always further away from victory than one of the top two. Therefore, if the voter wants 
to influence the outcome of the election, she needs to vote for one of the viable parties.7 
When ϕ is somewhere between 0 and 1, the voter sometimes votes for the party she likes 
the most and sometimes votes for the party she likes the most among viable parties. Which 
choice she makes depends on the values of her instrumental and expressive utilities (see 
below).
But when does she regret her vote choice? A voter regrets her choice if she realizes, 
after the election, that she made a choice that did not maximize her overall utility. In other 
words, a voter i regrets voting for party a if the utility of voting for some other party ω is 
higher than the utility of voting for a. Party ω can be either the party she likes the most or 
the party she likes the most among the viable parties. It is because i did not realize at the 
time of voting that she did not make the right choice. Furthermore, i does not regret voting 
for a if it was the party with the highest utility (a = ω). It is when her expected utility ex 
ante, which led her to vote for party a, does not coincide with the realized electoral out-
come that she regrets her vote, typically when she over- or underestimates the margin of 
victory between the top two candidates in the district.
Our mixed-utility theory then predicts that voters regret their choice in two situations:
(Situation 1)  She votes for the party she likes the most among the two viable parties in 
her district, though this party is not her favorite party. Then she realizes, 
after the election, that her vote did not help the party for which she voted to 
be elected, because the margin of victory between her district’s two viable 
parties is large.
(Situation 2)  A voter votes for the party she likes the most, though that party is not 
among the two viable parties in her district. Then she realizes, after the 
election, that her vote could have made a difference between the two viable 
parties, because the margin of victory between them is small.8
(1)Uia = 휙Uexpria + (1 − 휙)U
inst
ia
7 This line of reasoning is similar to the one adopted by studies of strategic voting (Cox 1997). One limi-
tation is that it neglects districts in which electoral competition involves three parties. If the third party is 
strong enough, the voter might still make a difference in the electoral outcome by voting for the third party. 
In a test of robustness, we extend the analyses by separating the respondents into two groups depending on 
the vote margin between the second and third party.
8 We make an extra assumption for this second prediction: the voter is not indifferent between the two 
viable parties. Given how we compute utilities, indifferent voters have no instrumental utility and therefore 
cannot experience regret (see below).
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In both situations, regret occurs because of the tradeoff the voter has to make between 
her two motives. At first glance, we could think that the voter might be purely instrumental 
in Situation 1 and purely expressive in Situation 2. But that would be wrong. In  Situa-
tion 1, the voter regrets voting for the party she likes the most among the viable parties 
because her vote did not help to elect that party. By saying that, we assume that she would 
have been better off voting for the party she liked the most among all competing parties. 
But that is true only if we consider that she also has expressive motives; otherwise, she 
would not even bother thinking about voting for her preferred party. Similarly, in Situation 
2, she regrets voting for her preferred party because her vote could have made a difference 
between the two viable parties. That is possible only if we consider that she also has an 
instrumental motive.
It is important to note that we are making two assumptions here: (1) the voter’s prefer-
ences for parties do not change between her vote and the moment at which she experiences 
regret, and (2) the voter knows the identities of the two viable parties in her district. Those 
two assumptions are necessary, as their negation would lead to other regret predictions. For 
example, a voter who voted for the party she likes the most but realizes, after the election, 
that she does not like it anymore would regret her vote even if she is purely expressive. 
Also, a voter who votes for what she thinks is a viable party but realizes, after the election, 
that it is not viable would also regret her vote even if she is purely instrumental.
In the empirical part of this paper, we relax the foregoing assumptions, by adding con-
trol variables that seek to capture other sources of regret. First, we add a variable captur-
ing whether respondents report having ambivalent preferences for different parties before 
the election. We expect that ambivalent voters are more likely to change preferences after 
the election. Also, we add a variable capturing whether respondents are able to identify 
correctly the viable parties in their districts before the election.9 We observe that more 
than 80% of the respondents are able to correctly identify the two parties with the greatest 
chances of winning. However, we do not assume that the voter is perfectly able to predict 
the electoral results. In fact, our predictions rely on the idea that the voter is able to cor-
rectly identify which parties are viable in her district, even if she wrongly anticipates the 
vote margin between the top two parties.
Now that we have identified the situations in which a voter with a mixed utility regrets 
her choice, we need to define the expressive and instrumental utilities represented in Eq. 1. 
As mentioned above, those utilities rely on a few measures: district-level electoral results 
and answers to one survey question: how much do you like each of the competing parties 
on a scale from 0 (really dislike) to 10 (really like)? That question was asked in the pre-
election survey conducted during the week preceding the election. We denote by Lia how 
much voter i likes party a. The intuition is straightforward: the voter derives a positive 
instrumental benefit when her vote makes a difference as to which party is elected in her 
district, and a positive expressive benefit when she votes for the party she likes the most. 
Also, it is important to note that since we are interested in the probability that the voter 
regrets her choice after the election, the electoral results are known.
The voter derives expressive utility when she likes the party for which she votes. We 
consider that the more she likes the party the greater is her expressive utility. However, 
not everybody has the same point of reference when they answer a survey question. Some 
9 In the pre-election wave of our survey, we asked respondents what the chances were of winning of each 
competing party on a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely). The exact wording of all questions 
used in our analyses can be found in the online appendix (A1).
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people might like most parties, some people might dislike them all. We thus need to com-
pare the way the voter likes party a to a reference point. For that purpose, we use how 
much the voter likes all parties other than party a (and we denote that average by Li−a).
The voter derives instrumental utility from her vote when she is pivotal (i.e., when the 
vote difference between the top two parties in her district is zero or one). That is the only 
situation in which her vote changes the election’s outcome. In real-life elections, when 
the number of voters is large, a single voter virtually is never pivotal. However, previous 
research shows that voters tend to overestimate the pivotality of their votes (Blais 2000; 
Castanheira 2003; Duffy and Tavits 2008; Kan and Yang 2001). Like them, we consider 
that such overestimation is related to the closeness of the election. When the two viable 
parties are very close, the probability of being pivotal approaches 1, and that probability 
declines further as the difference in vote shares between the top two parties increases. For-
mally, we measure the closeness of the race between the top two parties by:
where V1 is the vote share of party 1, the leading party in the district, and V2 is the vote 
share of party 2, the second-leading party in the district. Thus, C1,2 takes the value 1 when 
the two parties receive the same number of votes (the election is very close), and 0 when 
party 2 had 0% of the votes (the election is not close at all). We square the term to account 
for convexity of the closeness function: if the gap is two percentage points, then closeness 
is nearly as great as when the gap is 1 percentage point; if the gap is 10 percentage points, 
the election is much less close than a gap of 9% points.10
When a is one of the viable parties, the voter can think that her vote can make a differ-
ence, especially if the election is close. In that situation, instrumental utility is the differ-
ence between how much i likes a (denoted Lia) and how much she likes the other viable 
party (denoted Li (1 or 2)) multiplied by the closeness of the election (C12).11 If a is not one 
of the viable parties, voting for it cannot make a difference, so the voter’s instrumental util-
ity is nill.
Now that we have defined the expressive and instrumental utilities, we can write the 
voter’s overall utility that she derives from voting for party a. Recall that 휙 denotes the 
relative weight given by the voter to the expressive utility.
(2)Uexpria = Lia−Li−a
(3)C1,2 =
(
1−
(
V1−V2
))2
(4)For a = 1, 2 ∶ U
insrt
ia
= C12
(
Lia − Li (1 or 2)
)
For a ≠ 1, 2 ∶ Uinstr
ia
= 0
(5)
For a = 1, 2 ∶ Uia = 휙
(
Lia − Li−a
)
+ (1 − 휙)C12
(
Lia − Li (1 or 2)
)
For a ≠ 1, 2 ∶ Uia = 휙
(
Lia − Li−a
)
10 In a test of robustness, we reproduce the analyses using a linear version of the closeness variable, that is, 
without squaring the term.
11 In classic models of spatial competition, a voter’s utility usually is assumed to be a function of how 
her ideal point is from those of the parties or candidates on a potentially N-dimensional ideological policy 
space (Merrill and Grofman 1999). But the most direct indicator of the utility that is associated with a party 
is how much the voter likes that party. The more a voter likes a party the higher is her utility (Blais et al. 
2017).
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We compute this overall utility for all competing parties, so as to find out the utility 
associated with the party that is the voter’s best option (party ω) and then compare that to 
the utility associated with the party for which she ends up voting (party a). The problem 
with this approach is that for each voter, the identity of party ω may vary depending on the 
value of the parameter ϕ. As mentioned above, it can be either the party that the voter likes 
the most among the two viable parties (ω = 1, 2) or the party that she likes the most among 
all parties. More precisely, for each voter, a threshold ti exists such that:12
The relations in (6) have an important implication for the empirical part of the paper. 
Since ω depends on the value of ϕ, we need to compute, for each possible value of ϕ (from 
0 to 1), and for each voter, the overall utility associated with each party. Once that is done, 
we can replace, for each value of ϕ, the utility associated with party ω and compare it to 
the utility associated with party a. The larger the difference between the utility of voting for 
a and the utility of voting for ω the more likely the voter is to regret her choice.
Finally, note that the instrumental and expressive utilities vary between − 10 and + 10. 
They thus can be negative in principle. Utilities are negative when the voter votes for her 
least preferred of the two viable parties (instrumental utility) or for a party that she likes 
much less than other parties on average (expressive utility). Since we weight each term by 
ϕ and 1–ϕ, overall utility also can vary from − 10 to + 10. A negative utility is very rare 
in the data but, as a robustness test, we reproduce the analyses by dropping the respondents 
who voted for a party that gives them a negative utility overall (less than 5% of the 3058 
respondents).
3  The data
To test our mixed-utility theory, we use data from an original pre- and post-election panel 
survey conducted during Canada’s 2015 national election. The survey was conducted 
within the Making Electoral Democracy Work project (Blais 2010). Canadian federal elec-
tions are held under plurality rule in single-member districts, just like in the United States, 
the United Kingdom or India. In Canada, multiple parties compete in national elections. It 
is thus logically harder for voters to cast utility-maximizing votes.
The Liberal Party and its leader Justin Trudeau defeated the incumbent Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper of the Conservative Party in the 2015 Canadian election. The Liberal Party 
received 39% of the votes and 54% of the seats; it thus was able to form a majority govern-
ment. The Conservative party received 32% of the votes and 29% of the seats and formed 
the official opposition. The New Democratic Party (center-left) came in third; it obtained 
24% of the votes and 19% of the seats. The Bloc Québécois (Quebec independentist party), 
which competes only in Quebec, came in fourth with 5% of the votes and 3% of the seats. 
Finally, the Green Party obtained 3% of the votes and one seat (in British Columbia). No 
other party received more than 1% of the votes at the national level.
(6)
If 𝜙∕(1 − 𝜙) < ti, 𝜔 is the party that i likes the most among 1 and 2.
If 𝜙∕(1 − 𝜙) > ti, 𝜔 is the party that i likes the most among all parties.
12 The value of this threshold is found as follows: let Li** be the best evaluation of all parties and let Li* 
be the best evaluation of all viable parties. Let n be the number of parties. If Li** > Li* then, ti = (1–1/n) 
C12|Li1–Li2|/(Li**–Li*) and if Li** = Li*, then ti =+∞.
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After having ruled the country for almost 10 years, the incumbent Prime Minister was 
particularly unpopular in the Canadian electorate. For a long time, the polls predicted that 
the opposition party, the New Democratic Party, would win the election. However, about 
a month before Election Day, the Liberal Party gained considerable support and appeared 
to have a strong chance of winning the election, though it was unclear whether it would 
receive enough seats to form a majority government.
In our survey, we recruited respondents in the three largest provinces of the country 
(Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia) using pre-existing online panels.13 We adopted 
recruitment quotas based on age, education, gender and region to ensure the socio-demo-
graphic representativeness of the sample. We conducted the first wave of the survey during 
the two weeks preceding Election Day, and the second wave the week after. In each prov-
ince, about 1800 respondents completed the pre-election questionnaire, and among them 
about 1400 completed the post-election questionnaire.
As to measure vote choice regret, we used the responses to one survey question. In the 
post-election questionnaire, we asked respondents for which party they had voted. Then, 
right after that question, we asked them whether they thought they made a good decision 
in voting the way they did. Four response categories to that question were offered: the vote 
choice was a “very good”, a “fairly good”, a “fairly bad”, or a “very bad” decision.
Table  1 reports the aggregated responses to the regret question. It reveals that most 
respondents (61%) seem perfectly happy with the decision and say that they made a very 
good decision. However, we find that 36% of them acknowledge that they made only a 
fairly good decision, 3% a fairly bad decision, and 1% a very bad decision. Therefore 39% 
of voters are not completely happy with their choices. That proportion is similar to what 
Blais and Kilibarda (2016) find in other countries using the same question. They find that 
the proportion of voters expressing some regret ranges from 31 to 54%, depending on the 
country and the election.
In this paper, we use three different measures of regret based on the answers to the 
post-election survey question described above. In the main analysis, we use the original 
response categories of the variable (recoded from 0 “very good” to 3 “very bad”). Then, 
in a series of supplementary tests, we use two other versions of the variable. First, we 
Table 1  Regret in the 2015 
Canadian national election For which party did you vote? […]
Do you think your choice deci-
sion was
Proportion (%) N
Very good 61 1867
Fairly good 36 1089
Fairly bad 3 86
Very bad 1 16
13 Note that if we sum up the vote choices of all survey respondents, we observe that the vote share of the 
main parties is very similar to the actual electoral results. The largest difference concerns the Conservative 
Party in Ontario, which is underestimated by four percentage points, and the New Democratic Party in Brit-
ish Columbia, which is overestimated by the same margin. Most discrepancies between reported and actual 
vote shares are smaller than two percentage points. Those differences supply evidence that the survey sam-
ple is not biased in favor or against any particular party. The full distribution of the responses to the vote 
choice question is provided in the online appendix (A2).
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dichotomize the responses in distinguishing between respondents who say that they made 
a bad decision (fairly bad or very bad, 4%) and those who say that they made a good deci-
sion (fairly good or very good, 96%). We label that dummy variable ‘big regret’. Second, 
we dichotomize the responses in distinguishing respondents that are not completely happy 
with their votes (those who say that they made a fairly good decision, a fairly bad decision, 
or a very bad decision, 39%) and those who are not (those who indicated having made a 
very good decision, 61%). We label that dummy variable ‘small regret’. Expressing some 
doubt about the wisdom of one’s own decision, even by saying that it was ‘a fairly good 
decision’, is already a sign of regret.
To operationalize our mixed-utility theory, we use the answer to only one survey ques-
tion. In the pre-election questionnaire, we asked respondents how much they liked each 
of the main competing parties on a scale from 0 to 10 (from “really dislike” to “really 
like”).14 The main parties in Canada are the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the New 
Democratic Party, and the Green Party. A fifth party competed only in Quebec: the Bloc 
Québécois.
The details of all of the questions, including the distribution of responses, are reported 
in the online appendix. We also need the score (vote share) of each party in the respond-
ent’s district to compute the closeness of the election between the top two parties. We iden-
tify the district based on the postal code of the respondent.
4  Empirical analysis
We test the theory presented above against our survey data from Canada. To do so, we 
adopt an approach similar to a joint estimation of the parameters of interest. However, 
instead of using a built-in command, we decompose the different steps to be more transpar-
ent. First, we report the main analysis using the original four-category dependent variable; 
second, we report a series of supplementary tests showing that the results are robust to a 
wide range of specifications and other operationalizations of the dependent variable.
4.1  Main analysis
In line with our theory, we estimate the following regression model using an OLS 
specification:
Uia is the utility the respondent receives in voting for party a (the party for which she 
votes) and Uiω is the utility the respondent might have received in voting for her best vote 
choice (party ω). For the sake of clarity, we label the term Uiω–Uia as the ‘utility difference 
between vote and optimal party’. For each value of ϕ (for the definition of ϕ, see above), 
some respondents vote for their best vote choice; the term thus equals 0 for them. However, 
some respondents vote for a party that is not their best vote choice; they have a positive 
utility difference, which means that they do not vote for the party that maximizes their 
Degree of Regreti = 훽0 + 훽1
(
Ui휔 − Uia
)
+ 훽k Controlsi + 휀
14 By main party, we mean the parties that received at least 1% of the votes in the province. In our analyses, 
the party-liking variables are rescaled to vary between 0 and 1.
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utility. The higher the value of the term, the larger is the difference between vote cast and 
optimal party. Therefore, we expect β1 to be positive.
We also include control variables to account for potential confounding effects. First, we 
add two control variables to capture other sources of regret. We add a variable that is a dif-
ference between how much the respondent likes her most preferred party compared to how 
much she likes her second most preferred party (‘ambivalence’). The rationale is that if a 
respondent does not have a clear party preference, that is, she is ambivalent about two or 
more parties, the more likely she is to change her preference ordering. Hence, her expressed 
regret might be explained by the change in party preference and not to our mixed-utility 
theory. The findings confirm that indeed those who are ambivalent and therefore are more 
likely to change their preferences are more inclined to regret their choice after the election.
Second, we include a variable capturing whether the respondent has accurate expecta-
tions regarding the viability of her preferred party. In the pre-election survey, we asked 
respondents to evaluate the chances of winning for all competing parties (the question 
wording is in the online appendix). We then check their expectations in light of the actual 
electoral results. The variable ‘correct expectations’ takes the value of 1 if the respondent 
accurately identifies her preferred party as one of two parties with the highest chances of 
winning or not, and 0 in all other situations. We expect that respondents who have errone-
ous expectations were more likely to regret their choices. We also control for the over-
all satisfaction of respondents with the parties competing in the election. We expect that 
respondents who do not like any party are more likely to regret their choices. We create a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the respondent does not rate any party at 5 
or more on the 0–10 liking scale. The findings also confirm that voters with correct expec-
tations regarding electoral results are less likely to regret their choices while those who dis-
like all of the parties are more prone to express regret.
Furthermore, we also add Canadian provincial dummies to account for the nested char-
acter of our data, as well as several sociodemographic control variables: the respondent’s 
age, gender, and whether she has a university degree (all asked in the pre-election sur-
vey questionnaire). We also include dummy variables capturing the party for which she 
votes. We expect voters to experience less regret when the party for which they voted won 
the election and will form the government. It is also important to note that some of these 
variables have a statistically significant effect on the probability of a respondent regretting 
her vote choice: age (negative), dissatisfaction with parties in general (positive), ambiva-
lence (positive), and the act of voting for either the Liberal Party (negative) or the New 
Democratic Party (positive). As mentioned above, the Liberal Party won the 2015 Cana-
dian federal election and the New Democratic Party lost its status of official opposition. 
The evidence suggests that voters derive some positive ‘social’ benefits from voting for the 
national winner and negative ‘social’ benefits from voting for the national loser, which is in 
line with studies of bandwagon effects (Bartels 1985; McAllister and Studlar 1991).
Table 2 reports the regression results. As mentioned above, which party is identified as 
ω depends on how heavily the respondent weights expressive utility relative to instrumen-
tal utility. Therefore, we have different results for each value of ϕ. In Table 2, we present 
the estimates of the regression model specified above with ϕ varying between 0 and 1 (with 
steps of 0.1) When ϕ = 1, the respondent is purely expressive; when ϕ = 0, the respondent 
is purely instrumental.
Table 2 shows that, at each value of ϕ, the coefficient associated with the utility dif-
ference between vote and optimal party is positive and statistically significant at a level 
of p < 0.01. However, some coefficients are larger than others, indicating that the effect 
is stronger for some values of ϕ than for others. Typically, the coefficients are larger for 
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non-extreme values. The coefficient is particularly small when we assume that voters are 
mostly instrumental (ϕ approaching 0). It also is true, to a lesser extent, when we assume 
that voters are mostly expressive (ϕ approaching 1). In fact, the model that has the largest 
coefficient is the one where we suppose that the respondents weight expressive utility at 
60% and instrumental utility at 40%. We perform various SUEST tests to evaluate which 
coefficients are statistically different from the largest one (at ϕ = 0.6) and find that that 
applies to all regressions assuming that respondents are 60% or more instrumental (ϕ = 0.4) 
or 90% or more expressive (ϕ = 0.9). In other words, the best models are those assuming 
voters maximize a mixed-utility function. Moreover, all supplementary tests below show 
that the best model always is the one in which mixed-utility is assumed.
It is important to note that results of Table 2 do not mean that everybody in our sample 
weights expressive utility at 60% (and instrumental utility at 40%) in their vote choices. It 
means that the average weighting is 60% expressive, but it is possible that few respondents 
operate with this precise value of ϕ = 0.6. However, our data do not allow us to estimate 
parameter ϕ for each respondent individually. However, in the subsample analyses that we 
report below, we find that the optimal value of ϕ is always between 0.6 and 0.8. Those 
results are consistent with the view that a substantial proportion of voters have a mixed-
utility composed of both expressive and instrumental elements. Even in sub-groups for 
which we could have expected that expressive motives prevail (for example, respondents 
with little political knowledge), the value of ϕ = 0.6 fits the data best. We also perform 
below several robustness tests in which we change some regression parameters, such as the 
way closeness is calculated and find that the optimal value of ϕ always is around 0.6 (see 
below).
We now address the question how much regret our theory is able to predict. In theory, 
the main variable, the utility difference between actual vote and optimal vote, can vary 
between 0 (when party a = ω) and 20. That extreme positive value is almost impossible 
to reach. It is only reached when the expressive and instrumental utilities of party ω are 
maximal (expressive utility = 10 and instrumental utility = 10), but the respondent ends up 
voting for a party she strongly dislikes (expressive utility = − 10), and which is her lesser 
liked party among the two viable parties (instrumental utility = − 10). In reality, however, 
the utility difference between actual and optimal votes varies between 0 and 14, with 82% 
of the respondents having a value of 0 (meaning that they vote for the party that maximizes 
their mixed-utility),15 with a mean of 0.35 and a standard deviation of 1.14. It is interesting 
to note that 27% of utility-maximizing voters really like their favorite party (party liking of 
10). For them, there is not much of a choice. However, 29% of voters in that group do not 
have a strong preference: there is no party that they like more than 7.
In Fig. 1, we report the estimates of the benchmark model, which assumes that respond-
ents weight their expressive utility at 60% and their instrumental utility at 40%. It shows 
that the predicted value increases radically between the two empirical extremes (from 0.4 
to 1.4). This is the equivalent of moving from a situation in which the respondent is likely 
to say that she made either a very good or a fairly good decision to another in which she 
is likely to say that she made a fairly good or a fairly bad decision (first-difference test, 
p < 0.01).
Second, as mentioned above, 82% of the survey respondents maximized their mixed 
utility if we assume that ϕ = 0.6. For the remaining respondents, the mean is 1.97 and the 
15 It is interesting to note that the proportion is similar to the proportion of ‘correct votes’ that Lau and 
Redlawsk (1997) find in the United States in their cross-sectional study.
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standard deviation is 2.02. A shift of two standard deviations around that mean produces an 
increase in the predicted value of the dependent variable from 0.4 to 0.7. That also is a sub-
stantial increase as it means moving from a situation wherein the respondent is more likely 
to say that she made a good decision to another one in which she is more likely to say that 
she only made a fairly good decision (first-difference test, p < 0.01).
4.2  Supplementary tests
We conduct a series of supplementary tests to ensure that the results presented above are 
robust. In the online appendix, we show the coefficient associated to the utility difference 
between vote and optimal party for each value of ϕ (A4 and A6), and the full results of the 
regressions for which this is the highest (A5 and A7).
First, we re-estimate the regression of the main analysis with alternative dependent vari-
ables. We re-estimate an OLS regression with (1) the ‘big regret’ dummy variable (fairly 
or very bad decision versus fairly or very good decision), and (2) the ‘small regret’ dummy 
variable (fairly bad, very bad, fairly good versus very good decision). Then, we estimate 
the following models predicting the degree of regret as in the main analysis: (1) defining 
the closeness of the race between the top two parties in the district with a linear function 
instead of concave function and (2) excluding respondents who voted for a party with a 
negative utility. Table A5 shows that the coefficient for the utility difference between vote 
Fig. 1  Predicted probabilities of small regret (ϕ = 0.6). Note: The line is the predicted values of an OLS 
regression and the shaded area is the 95% confidence interval. Other independent variables are set at their 
mean. The histogram at the bottom shows the distribution of the utility difference between vote cast and 
optimal party
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and optimal party is similar in the five alternative regressions described above. It varies 
from 0.02 (big regret) to 0.14 (no negative utility) and always is statistically significant at 
p < 0.01 level.
Second, we re-estimate the OLS regression of the main analysis for various subsam-
ples. First, we distinguish respondents by their level of campaign knowledge. To do so, 
we use a survey question of the post-election questionnaire that asks respondents to match 
three actual campaign slogans with one of the three main parties (the Liberal Party, the 
Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party). We distinguish between respondents 
who are able to correctly match all three slogans (high knowledge), and those who are not 
able to do so (low knowledge). We expect the effect of the utility difference between vote 
and optimal party to be larger for knowledgeable voters, because our theory assumes that 
voters are aware of the electoral results the week following the election. Knowledgeable 
voters are more likely to closely follow the election than others. Also, they are more likely 
to have accurate expectations regarding the results of the upcoming election and thus are 
more likely to cast votes that maximize their utility.
Then, we also distinguish between respondents who are in a district where the vote mar-
gin between the second and third party is larger than 0.1, and those who are not. We expect 
our mixed-utility theory to work best when a clear margin emerges between the second and 
third party because we define viability by considering only the two top parties in the dis-
trict. Table A7 shows that the coefficient for the utility difference between vote and optimal 
party always is positive and statistically significant at a level of p < 0.01. We find that ϕ 
never takes the value of 1 (purely expressive) nor 0 (purely instrumental). It varies between 
0.6 and 0.7. This supplies additional evidence that a substantial proportion of voters have 
mixed utility functions comprising both expressive and instrumental elements.
5  Conclusion
The topic of vote choice regret has made the headlines in the weeks following important 
elections, such as the Brexit referendum or the election of Donald Trump as the President 
of the United States. A substantial number of voters have said that they would have voted 
differently if they had known the electoral outcome. Such a situation is obviously prob-
lematic, especially when the election is so close that the regretful voters were numerous 
enough to change the electoral result.
This paper is the first to examine systematically the sources of vote choice regret. To do 
so, we develop a new theory, which supposes that voters have mixed-utility functions com-
posed of both instrumental and expressive motives. We then test this theory using unique 
pre- and post-election survey data from the 2015 Canadian national election. In the post-
election wave, conducted in the immediate aftermath of the election, we asked respondents 
whether they regret their vote choices or not. We find that 39% of them were not perfectly 
happy with their decision, and 4% even said that they made a bad decision. The 2015 Cana-
dian national election is different from the emblematic elections with surprising outcomes 
mentioned above in the senses that the result was not unexpected and that more than two 
credible options were available. We show that our mixed-utility theory explains an impor-
tant fraction of the regret expressed after the election results were known. We believe that, 
with some minor amendments, our theory can apply to all elections, including those held 
under proportional representation rules. Various studies find that some voters also seek to 
influence the electoral outcome in those systems (Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Duch et  al. 
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2010; Indridason 2011). However, the story would need to be more complex given that 
coalition agreements also have the capacity to influence the electoral outcome.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on voting behavior. Traditionally, this litera-
ture assumes, sometimes implicitly, that individual voters have either instrumental motives, 
in the sense that they care about the outcome of the election, or expressive motives, in the 
sense that they care about voting for a party or a candidate they like. However, very few 
studies integrate the two in a single model (for an exception, see Myatt 2007).
Finally, our paper shows that including a regret question in surveys can help to under-
stand what motivates people to vote in the first place. We believe our approach has great 
potential for behavioral studies in general. Many theoretical and experimental studies 
investigate human decisions and behaviors by making assumptions about why people act 
the way they do. Asking people whether they regret a decision immediately after the deci-
sion was taken in real life can be a good way of learning about their motives. The regret 
concept also is used in game theory. For example, a Nash equilibrium is a situation in 
which nobody regrets her decision. Therefore, we believe that more surveys should include 
a regret question, thereby allowing researchers to test their underlying assumptions regard-
ing people’s motives.
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